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WATER SECURITY, FEAR MITIGATION AND
INTERNATIONAL WATER LAW
A. Dan Tarlock!
I. INTRODUCTION: IS WATER FOR FIGHTING OR
BARGAINING?
A. Why We Worry About Shortage-Driven Water Conflicts
Water lawyers, courts, and others in the water community are fond
of quoting the quip attributed to Mark Twain, "whiskey is for drinking and
water is for fighting over." Not only is there no evidence that Twain ever
uttered these words,2 but the quote has taken on a life of its own which
grossly distorts the nature of water competition disputes, especially state to
state competition. Both whiskey and water are for human benefit and exist in
sufficient quantities throughout the world to satisfy present and future
demand.3 Meeting these demands will be challenging because water must be
managed to counter the problems of mal-distribution in certain places.
Nonetheless, the idea that water conflict can and will lead to violence is so
powerful that the term "war" is often applied to intense but nonviolent
conflicts over the use of water.4 The war metaphor implies that water
conflicts are irresolvable unless one party totally prevails over the other. In
reality, water violence happens; when it does, it is generally localized,
although water facilities have been military targets. This said, many water
disputes, especially international ones, simmer unresolved for decades.
Festering disputes are cause for concern because the ultimate driver
in many water conflicts, both peaceful and potentially violent, is the fear of
Distinguished Professor of Law, Chicago-Kent College of Law; Honorary
Professor, UNESCO Centre for Water Law, Science and Policy, University of Dundee
(Scotland); A.B., LL.B., Stanford University. I would like to thank my colleague, Professor
Sungjoon Cho, for his helpful comments derived from his expertise in international trade law
and the members of the Hamline Law Review for organizing the symposium in St. Paul,
Minnesota on April 4, 2008, which helped me focus the final article.
2 Guy Rocha, What Mark Twain Didn't Say, Nevada State Archives Historical
Myth No. 153, http://dmla.clan.lib.nv.us/docs/nslalarchives/myth/myth153.htm.
3 See UNITED NATIONS ET AL., WATER: A SHARED RESPONSffiILITY 120-153
(2006), available at http://www.unesco.orglwater/wwap/wwdr2/table30ntents.shtml
(analyzing the state of water as a natUral resource and best practices for conserving it in order
to meet world demands).
4 See, e.g., PETER ANNlN, THE GREAT LAKES WATER WARS 4-5 (2006); MICHAEL
T. KLARE, REsOURCE WARS: THE NEW LANDSCAPE OF GLOBAL CONFLICT 25 (2001); Lee A.
Laudicina, International Water Disputes: How to Prevent A War Over the Nile River, 4 LoY.
U. CHI.INT'L L. REv. 235 (2007). I plead guilty to employing this descriptive device. HOLLY
DOREMUS & A. DAN TARLOCK, WATER WAR IN THE KLAMATH BASIN: MACHO LAW, COMBAT
BIOLOGY, AND DIRTY POLITICS (2008) (piling on the fighting metaphors in a discussion of the
history of the on-going conflict in the Klamath Basin over the balance between a historic
irrigation community and ecosystem conservation).
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drought. One reads in the Old Testament, "I will make your heavens like iron
and your earth like brass; and your strength shall be spent in vain, for your
land shall not yield its increase, and the trees of the land shall not yield their
fruit."s This famous curse, which was hurled at the Israelites as they are
about to enter the Promised Land, exemplifies the ever contingent
relationship between rainfall and the survival of civilization. In the biblical
creation story, water was created on the second day and its abundance
remained a sign of divine approval throughout the Old Testament, just as its
absence, as illustrated by Leviticus, was a sign of God's anger at humanity.
Fear of its absence is almost universal. For example, it is deeply rooted in the
development of civilization in the twin arid areas of Mesopotamia as well as
in northern China.6
Water shortage fears were carried to the arid Mediterranean and then
the New World.7 However, this fear receded with increased faith in the
ability of science and technology to adapt to harsh climates. Human
adaptation to climate constraints gradually pushed any idea of respect for
nature from "civilization as it expanded from the relatively benign climate of
the Mediterranean to northern Europe."s In the last two centuries, awe and
respect for nature were completely replaced by the hubris that humans can
improve upon it at no cost. In the United States, the Puritans rejected the
view that natural disasters were a divine retribution for humankind's sins.
Just as one could not gain God's grace, one could not lose it by one's own
efforts. The road to the modem view that nature should impose no
constraints on human development is long and twisting. Tort law's
subsequent sharp distinction between fault and non-fault was an important
step toward the modem philosophy that government has a duty to prevent
and mitigate disasters for conditions that an individual did not cause.9 The
move to ground liability in fault rather than the earlier simple theory that the
tortfeasor caused an injury contributed to the expectation that adaptation to
"acts of God" was not an individual responsibility. The large multipurpose
reservoirs and dams constructed in the United States and throughout the
world are testimony to the triumph of this idea.
Leviticus 26:19-20.
In the Chinese creation story, after 45,600 years of rule by mythical human-
beast emperors, the legendary monarch Fu Xi and his sister-consort Nu Wu appeared between
2852 and 2734 B.C. on the North China Plain. MILTON W. MEYER, CIllNA: A CONCISE
HISTORY 116 (2d ed. 1994). They are credited with the invention of writing, music, marriage
and the worship of a supreme being as well as with water management and flood control,
which is "crucial to the well-being of the Chinese state." [d.
7 See PETER BURKE, THE ITALIAN RENAISSANCE 125 (rev. ed. 1986) ("[The]
image of the Virgin Mary in the church of Impruneta, near Florence . . . was carried in
procession to produce rain in times of drought or to stop the rain when there was too much ...
.").
LG. SIMMONS, ENVIRONMENTAL HISTORY 179 (1993).
See Michele L. Landis, "Let Me Next Time Be 'Tried by Fire"'; Disaster Relief
and the Origins of the American Welfare State 1789-1874, 92 Nw. U. L. REv. 967, 988-98
(1998).
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Despite the use of the science of technology to overcome the fear of
shortage, the fear that supplies may not be secure remains and is growing in
many parts of the world due to a combination of enduring and new factors.
The two enduring fears among nations are use opportunity preemption and
normal supply variability. The fIrst reflects the risk that wealthier or more
rapidly growing states will preempt future development opportunities by
building incompatible projects. This is a typical fear of upstream states, but
upstream states can equally preempt downstream opportunities. Capture can
ripen into a vested right because once the project is built, the clock starts
ticking on a vested rights claim, a subject discussed in the next section. The
second fear has always been a factor in water planning and management due
to inevitable climate cycles. Global warming magnifies this traditional fear
because some of the most severe impacts will be felt by weak states with
limited economic and political capacity to adapt to projected water stresses.
Thus, the third fear raises the specter that the problem may be beyond the
management capability of many countries and will produce various forms of
instability, including violence and civil unrest, which spill across borders. Io
There is growing speculation by serious military and foreign policy experts
about the relationships among climate change, political stability, resource
scarcity, hot war and widespread social unrest such as large-scale population
migrationY There is considerable concern that water scarcity could be a
source of costly and inhumane regional instability, especially in weak
"transition" states with an expanding population and an already stressed food
supply due to dependence on domestic agriculture. I2 The net result is that
today water security is a more complex matter than it was when the term
meant only a fIrm entitlement to a fIxed allocation protected by courts, other
tribunals or diplomatic pressure.
B. The Argument: Worry But Manage Stressed Water Resources
This article fIrst summarizes the available evidence linking armed
conflict and water scarcity, which concludes that violent, water-related
conflicts are unlikely to occur even in the identifIed Middle Eastern and
African "hot spots." It nonetheless cautions that the possibility of larger-scale
conflicts over water, especially in light of global warming scenarios, cannot
be entirely discounted. Second, it examines the different defInitions of water
10 CNA CORP., NATIONAL SECURITY AND THE THREAT OF CLIMATE CHANGE 13-18
(2007), available at http://securityandclimate.cna.orglreportl.
11 See, e.g., GERMAN ADVISORY COUNCIL ON GLOBAL CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE
AS A SECURITY RISK (2008), available at http://www.wbgu.de/wbgu.jg2007_engl.pdf; DAN
SMITH & JANANI VIVEKANANDA, A CLIMATE OF CONFLICT: THE LINKS BETWEEN CLIMATE
CHANGE, PEACE AND WAR (2007), available at http://www.intemational-
alert.orgipublications/getdata.php?doctype=Pdf&id=322&docs=980.
12 See Anthony Nyong, Climate-Related Conflicts in West Africa, 2006-2007
ENVTL. CHANGE & SECURITY PROJECT REp. 36, 36-37, available at
http://www.wilsoncenter.orgitopics/pubslNyong12.pdf.
L.. _
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security or insecurity now on the table that arise from traditional and modem
fears. Third, it compares the case for conflict with the case for cooperation.
Fourth, it discusses the role that international water might play in
encouraging or discouraging either conflict or cooperation.
The basic argument is that the power of fear to exacerbate tensions
must be factored into the analysis on many regional water conflicts, but the
fear of inadequate future supplies does not inevitably lead to violence and
social disruption. Nations have cooperated to share common supplies or lived
with high levels of uncertainty.13 Thus, cooperation rather than conflict is the
likely future result because a monetary cost of conflict resolution is often
reasonable and the joint benefits of cooperation outweigh the costs of
alternatives. The law can playa positive role in mitigating fear by defining
water security, as international water traditionally has, as a fairly apportioned
common source of supply.14 However, to generate the trust necessary to
alleviate fears, a fair allocation must be augmented by adaptive, integrated
management institutions.
II. OFF TO WAR OVER WATER?
A. The Rise and Fall and Rebirth ofGeographical Determinism and
Water Conflict
There is a long intellectual tradition of speculation by historians and
geographers about the relationships among a civilization - its sustainability,
climate, the civilization's use of its natural endowments, environment and
conflict or social disruption.15 Many scholars have linked the decline of
ancient civilizations to various types of human and natural environmental
degradation.16 Droughts and unsustainable irrigation practices have been
13 For a relatively optimistic assessment of the possibility of environmental and
water conflict resolution cooperation with examples of current efforts, see Alexander Carius,
Environmental Peacebuilding: Conditions for Success, 2006-2007 ENVTL. CHANGE &
SECURITY PROJECT REp. 59, available at http://www.wilsoncenter.org/topics/pubs/
CariusEPI2.pdf.
14 As a leading student of this issue, Aaron T. Wolf has noted, "an equitable
water-sharing agreement is a prerequisite to hydropolitical stability." Aaron T. Wolf, Criteria
for Equitable Allocations: The Heart of International Water Conflict, 23 NAT. RESOURCES F.
3, 23 (1999), available at http://www.transboundarywaters.orst.edu/publications/allocations/
#paper.
15 See, e.g., NORMAN POUNDS, AN HISTORICAL AND POLITICAL GEOGRAPHY OF
EUROPE (1947).
16 See, e.g., J. DONALD HUGHES, PAN'S TRAVAIL: ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS OF
THE ANCIENT GREEKS AND ROMANS 194 (1994) (concluding that "[e]nvironmental changes as
a result of human activities must be judged to be one of the causes of the decline of ancient
Greek and Roman civilization"). However, one must be cautious of single factor explanations.
For example, the reason for the disappearance of the Anasazi civilization on the Colorado
Plateau is now being supplemented by a more nuanced explanation that includes a religious
reformation. See George Johnson, Vanished: A Pueblo Mystery, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 8, 2008 § F,
at 1.
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blamed for the decline of the Sumerian civilization and others. This led to the
theory of geographical determinism, which in its most extreme form posits
that geography and climate determine a country's fate. 17 However,
geographical determinism fell out of favor among geographers and historians
in the United States, due in part to the Nazis' use of the theory to justify the
need for a greater German Reich at the expense of her eastern neighbors,18
and the rise of more sophisticated economic and cultural explanations for the
way in which different countries develop. However, the theory never
completely died. For example, in the midst of the 1945 Potsdam Conference,
which carved up Germany and legitimated the Iron Curtain, President
Truman startled Generalissimo Stalin and Prime Minister Churchill by
announcing that his study of history led him to include that "water ... straits
and canals and rivers" were the source of 200 years of European wars.19
The current concern over global climate change-induced resource
scarcity and degradation is producing a renewed interest in the links among
climate, geography and society, especially war or dangerous social
disruption, and thus a new neo-graphical determinism.2o In the 1990's,
proponents of international action to address environmental degradation
expanded the traditional notion of national security as a defined territory
defended by military might and began to link the "health" or "ill health" of a
nation's environment to its national security.21 A deteriorating environment
17 The idea, as were most intellectual ideas in late nineteenth and early twentieth
century America, was brought to the United States from Germany by the geographer Ellen
Churchill Semple. See generally ELLEN CHURCHILL SEMPLE, INFLUENCES OF THE GEOGRAPHIC
ENVlRONMENT (1911).
18 See Richard Peet, The Social Origins of Environmental Determinism, 75
ANNALS AM. ASS'N GEOGRAPHERS 309 (1985) (discussing the social underpinnings of the
ideology of environmental determinism). Geographical determinism allowed historians to
explain the distinctive cultural and economic patterns which developed in particular regions.
[d. at 319-22. Environmental determinism paid particular attention to the role of climate on
culture and society. [d. However, this simplistic cause and effect relationship was rejected in
the United States in the 1920s and died after World War IT, after Nazi Germany used earlier
works by German scholars to support racial explanations for alleged superiority of northern
European culture and the need for "lebensraum." [d. at 316. As a result of this misuse of
science, the emphasis on human adaptation to climate and the landscape gradually receded
from the story of civilization. SlMMONS, supra note 8, at 178-79.
19 CHARLES M. LEE, JR., MEETING AT POTSDAM 197 (1975). President Truman was
quite peeved when Stalin ultimately refused to include a proposal for an international
waterways authority on the conference agenda. [d. at 275-76.
20 See generally, W. GoRDON EAST, THE GEOGRAPHY BEHIND HISTORY: How
PHYSICAL ENVlRONMENT AFFECTS HISTORICAL EVENTS (1965); David D. Zhang et al., Global
Climate Change, War and Population Decline in Human History, 104 PROC. NAT'L ACAD.
SCI. 19214 (2007) (showing that cooling is associated with reduced food production, famine,
and war in China and Europe between 1400 and 1900; similar disruptions might result from
the adverse impacts of global warming). The leading proponent of the new determinism is
Professor Jared Diamond, whose books GUNS, GERMS, AND STEEL: THE FATES OF HUMAN
SOCIETIES (1997) and COLLAPSE: How SOCIETIES FAIL OR SUCCEED (2005), have triggered a
lively debate about the relationship between a nation's natural resources and its culture.
21 See GERMAN ADVISORY COUNCIL ON GLOBAL CHANGE, supra note 11, at 29-23.
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can be a source of internal conflict which can spill across borders.22 The
more serious risks are linked to insufficient food supplies or mineral wealth
competition. This argument was taken up by Warren Christopher, Secretary
of State during the. Clinton Administration. The widely accepted view that
global warming is here has accelerated this speculation with regard to water
and ecosystem change. From the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change (!PCC) down, scientists generally agree that warming may result in
less net available water in areas that are already water-stressed. Regional
instability in Africa and Asia, which includes the Middle East, is increasing
as the "major" powers have less ability to dampen it and is a special area of
concern because population growth bumps up against limited, often
degraded, natural resources, including water.
B. How Serious is the Risk ofReal Water Wars or Serious Social
Disruption?
How serious is the future risk of large-scale water-driven violence?
To date, the lesson of history is not much, but this is not a definitive answer.
There are documented instances of violence connected to water disputes, but
most violence, especially that related to water shortage,23 is localized and
short-lived.24 For example, the head gates of a federal irrigation project in
Oregon were dynamited after the Bureau of Reclamation closed them, in the
summer of 2001, to leave sufficient water in an upstream lake for listed
endangered species.25 The isolated and small-scale nature of water conflicts
is confirmed by the major data base, the Water Conflict Chronology
maintained by the Pacific Institute?6 The latest version starts with the
In 2007, Senators Chuck Hagel and Richard Durbin introduced legislation which would
require the U.S. military to play war games to determine how climate change might affect
national security. Global Climate Change Security Oversight Act, S. 1018, BOth Congo
(2007) (as referred to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence); see also Bryan Bender,
Bill Ties Climate to National Security, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 9, 2001.
22 See, e.g., Donald Kennedy et al., Environmental Quality and Regional Conflict,
CARNEGIE COMM'N ON PREVENTING DEADLY CONFLICT, Dec. 1998,
http://stephenschneider.stanford.edulPublicationsIPDF_PaperslEnvironmentalQualityAndRegi
onalConflict.pdf. One of the leading proponents of this theory is Thomas F. Homer-Dixon.
See THOMAS F. HOMER-DIXON, ENVIRONMENT, SCARCITY, AND VIOLENCE (2001).
23 Water management problems arise from either a lack or an excess of water.
This article focuses on problems of inadequate supply but it recognizes that widespread
flooding can be a serious social problem and a source of insecurity.
24 Don Phelps, Water and Conflict: Historical Perspective, 133 J. WATER
REsOURCES PLAN. & MGMT. 382 (2007) (arguing that countries rarely go to battle over water
and fights over water have generally "been initiated between individuals or small enclaves of
individuals and not between sovereigu bodies").
25 See DOREMUS & TARLOCK, supra note 4, at 4. The conflict is unresolved, but
the violence was not repeated. A combination of wet years and government intervention has
kept the head gates open in the summer.
26 Peter Gleick, Water Conflict Chronology, PAC.INST. FOR STUD. IN DEV., ENV'T
& SECURITY, Feb. 2008, http://www.worldwater.org/conflictchronology.pdf.
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Sumerian account of a flood to punish the sinful abuse of the earth and ends
with a Hezbollah attack on an Israeli waste water treatment plant. But, most
of the modem serious incidents are either the selection of water facility
targets during a Wm?7 or small village disputes in Asia and Africa. Thus, it is
too broad to draw serious policy conclusions. This is not the end of the
inquiry; there is a case for not following that adage that the past is prologue.
The main message of modem environmentalism is that intensifying human
use of the planet is causing unprecedented levels of change, much of which
can legitimately be classified as environmental degradation.28 When change
occurs in areas already stressed by climate and political instability, the risk of
resource related violence can increase. This is not to say that violence is
inevitable; it only says, as the studies discussed in this section show, that the
warning signs are there and cannot be easily discounted.
To assess more accurately the threats to domestic and international
security, it is necessary to distinguish among three potentially intertwined
concepts of water conflicts. Conflicts can arise from water stress, "serious"
water use competition, and the fear of permanently denied access to water.29
The three form a continuum of shortage risks as well as the likely response
of a country. Water stress refers to the possibility (or fear) that available
future supplies, especially in areas vulnerable to global warming, will not be
available to satisfy all future demands, especially for irrigated agriculture.
Serious water stress refers to the possibility that supplies will exceed demand
in the foreseeable future because the available supply cannot satisfy all uses.
This problem arises frequently when different uses demand different water
levels and flows at different times of the year. The fear of permanent denial
arises when one party seeks to control the source to the detriment of other
users. This problem can occur between nations or within a nation.3D All
levels of stress are a common condition in arid and semiarid developed and
developing countries, and modem domestic water management systems can
be understood as responses to these stresses. There is increasing concern that
stress may invade humid regions as droughts become more frequent and
evaporation increases, canceling any increased precipitation in higher
latitudes. In brief, the consensus is that rainfall will decrease in the arid sub-
27 See DANIEL HilLEL, RIvERS OF EDEN: THE STRUGGLE FOR WATER AND THE
QUEST FOR PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST 266 (1994) ("During the Persian Gulf War of 1991,
both sides targeted waterworks such as dams, desalinization plants, and water conveyance
systems. Most of Kuwait's desalinization capacity was destroyed by the retreating Iraqis.").
28 J. DONALD HUGHES, AN ENVIRONMENTAL HISTORY OF THE WORLD:
HUMANKIND'S CHANGING ROLE IN THE COMMUNITY OF LIFE 199 (2001).
29 See generally L. Ohlsson, Water Conflicts and Social Resources Scarcity, 25
PHYSICS & CHEMISTRY EARTH 213 (2000) (classifying scarcity as demand-driven, supply-
driven or the result of structural inequities among different groups of water users).
30 See Irna van der Molen & Antionette Hildering, Water: Cause for Conflict or
Cooperation?, 1 ISYP J. ON SCI. & WORLD AFF. 133, 134-35 (2005), available at
http://www.scienceandworldaffairs.orgIPDFsNanDerMolenHilderin~Voll.pdf (reviewing
the literature on structural scarcity).
C. Competition: Chronic But Containable?
Competition, of course, is characteristic of all water disputes when
there is fear of future shortage. Stress and serious competition can be
magnified on international river systems because the interstate rights are
often uncertain and dispute resolution mechanisms are limited. International
and interregional competition is often associated with geographical destiny.
Geographically or socially disadvantaged nations fear that future options will
be pressured or preempted by the actions of other nations. Lower riparian
state competition with headwater states is a classic example of the fears and






GERMAN ADVISORY COUNCIL ON GLOBAL CHANGE, supra note 11, at 81-82.
Molen & Hildering, supra note 30, at 136-137.
Lorin Pottinger, Who Loses in the "Win-Win" Scheme to Dam the Nile Basin?,
DEVELOPMENT TODAY, Sept. 21, 2004, available at http://www.internationalrivers.orglenl
africainile-basinlwho-loses-win%E2%80%93win-scheme-dam-nile-basin.
34 INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2001:
IMPACTS, ADAPTATION & VULNERABILITY 496-97 (James J. McCarthy et al. eds., 2001),
available at http://www.grida.no/climatelIPCC_tar/wg2/pdf/wg2TARchapI0.pdf.
35 Id. at 495.
36 JAKUB LANDOVSKY, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REpORT 2006: INSTITUTIONAL
ASSESSMENT OF TRANSBOUNDARY WATER RESOURCES MANAGEI\1ENT 10 (2006),
http://hdr.undp.orglenlreports/globa1lhdr2006/papersllandovsky%20jakub.pdf.
37 See Charles B. Bourne, The International Law Association's Contribution to
International Water Resources Law, in INTERNATIONAL LAW OF WATER RESOURCES 3 (Dr.
tropics and increase in high latitudes. However, in these areas, the net
amount of water may be less because evaporation rates will rise as
temperatures rise and there may be drought-flood cycles.31 Climate change is
the gorilla in the water room because it increases anxiety by raising the
possibility that many stressed areas, which continue to function on available
supplies, may be bumped into the second and third categories.32 The
problems that warming scenarios may pose for the Nile Basin are illustrative.
Global warming threatens to make the yearly flows of Mrica's rivers even
less reliable for large hydro projects than they are now, as well as more
precarious for other uses. Over half of Basin states get more than 90% of
their electricity from hydropower, while another three are 70% dependent on
hydropower.33 Experts believe that dry parts of Africa will see further
reductions in precipitation. In the Nile Basin, according to the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, there has already been "a
reduction in runoff of 20% between 1972 and 1987" and "significant
interruptions in hydropower generation as a result of severe droughts.,,34 A
1995 study of climate impacts on several major rivers worldwide noted that
the Nile experienced the most severe change of the rivers studied.35 Central
Asia faces similar problems. Melting glaciers in the Pamir Mountains,
headwaters of the Amy Darya River will increase winter runoff but decrease
summer runoff, furthering threatening irrigation in the region.36
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mountain countries of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan with their Central Asian
cotton growing downstream neighbors, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and
Turkmenistan, is a classic example of potential incompatible different uses.
The headwaters states want to hold back water for winter hydropower
production when it is needed downstream for summer irrigation. The long
simmering tension among Turkey, Syria and Iraq is a classic example of the
power of upstream states to preempt downstream opportunities.38 Long
before the United States-led invasion of Iraq, the vibrant agricultural
economy of the lower Tigris and Euphrates Basin was jeopardized by
Turkey's aggressive, more recent upstream development.39 China is another
example of a headwaters state with the capacity for rapid, preemptive
development. It is not a party to the Lower Mekong River Treaty but now
has the capacity to substantially influence Lower Basin river flows and the
ecology of the basin by its construction of a cascade of hydroelectric
reservoirs on headwaters tributaries.4o
Competition and conflict do not mean that the parties will resort to
violence. There is no simple relationship between the degree of stress and the
likelihood of violence, and there is ample precedent that competition and
conflict will produce cooperation. The more than 200 water-related treaties
in force testify to the fact that it is possible to settle or at least confine water
disputes to manageable proportions. Modem technology provides water
managers and users with much accurate real-time information which can
help to reduce some of the uncertainty inherent in water use.41 European
countries have provided a great deal of aid to support cooperative solutions
in Asia and Africa. The next section examines the hypothesis that
cooperation rather than violence is the likely outcome of water conflicts.
Patricia Wouters & Dr. Serguei Vinogradov eds., 2001). One of the leading forces in the
development of the doctrine of equitable and utilization reports that upstream/downstream
conflicts were the impetus for the International Law Association's development of rules and
that there were sharp differences of opinion among up and downstream states. Id.
38 See Stephen McCaffrey, Water, Politics, and International Law, in WATER IN
CRISIS (Peter Gleick ed., 1993), reprinted in INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND
POLlCY 869, 869-71 (Weiss et al. eds., 2d ed. 2006).
39 Id. at 870 (discussing the Turkish water project that "could cause Syria to lose
up to 40 percent of its water from the Euphrates and Iraq as much as 90 percent"). In response
to Syria and Iraq's concerns over the loss, ''Turkish officials have denied any obligation to
provide water to downstream countries." Id. at 871.
40 DR. GEORGE E. RADOSEVICH & MR. DOUGLAS C. OLSON, EXISTING AND
EMERGING BASIN ARRANGEMENT IN ASIA: MEKONG RIvER COMMISSION CASE STUDY 8 (1999),
http://lnwebI8.worldbank.orglESSD/ardext.nsf/18ByDocNamelMekongRiverComCaseStudy/
$FILElMekgongRiverComCaseStudy.pdf.
41 See Elizabeth Soderstrom et al., Int'l Water Mgmt. Inst., Transboundary
Collaborative Learning: Case Study in the Okavango Basin (draft report),
http://www.iwrni.cgiar.org/AssessmentlFILES/word/ProjectDocuments/Okavango/Okavango_
Draft%20Report.pdf (describing the creation of a database to help guide future management
decisions among Angola, Botswana, and Namibia over the use of this vital African river). See
text accompanying infra notes 91 to 95 for a brief discussion of the Okavango issues and
management initiatives.
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ill. THE CASE AGAINST THE VIOLENCE THEORY
A. Money Conquers All
713
The case against the hypothesis that water conflict will lead to
violence rests on the power of money to produce sufficient incentives to
reduce uncertainty by creating the legal and management regimes to adapt to
existing and new stresses. Economists reject the inevitable conflict
hypothesis because to them water is simply another commodity with a price
which factors fear out of the equation. Thus, water is for trading, not
fighting. Those who control water but "irrationally" fail to share it face a
high opportunity cost or loss of value and must inevitably come to their
senses. To foster cooperation, they invoke the Coase theorem, which posits
that rational actors will bargain toward the efficient allocation of a scarce
resource regardless of the initial distribution of ownership rights.42 A 2005
study of the longest running contemporary water conflict, the dispute among
Israel, the Palestinian Authority, Jordan and Syria over the area's limited
surface and groundwater supplies, found that all parties would achieve
substantial gains from water trades.43 The division of the Mountain Aquifer
is 76% to Israel and 24% Palestine.44 According to the study, water trades
could result in "total joint gains [ot] about $84 million to $95 million per
year.,,45
B. From Allocation to Benefit Sharing
Economics does playa power role in conflict resolution by exposing
the monetary benefits of cooperation. It is often said that "water runs uphill
towards money," and international water law is embracing an economic-
based approach to supplement the traditional declaration of rights, which can
lead to a winner takes all approach. The alternative is the shared benefit
model derived from welfare economics. The model posits that water is
valuable only as a scarce resource with alternative values. Thus, the
transcendental objective of efficiency requires that the resource be allocated
to the most valuable suit of uses. This means that some nations will have to
forego the actual use of wet water but are entitled to monetary compensation
for making it possible for other states to put the water to its most efficient
use.46
(1960).
42 See generally Ronald Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1
43 See FRANKLIN M. FISHER ET AL., LIQUID ASSETS: AN EcONOMIC APPROACH FOR
WATER MANAGEMENT AND CONFLICT REsOLUTION IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND BEYOND 196-218
(2005).
44 [d. at 205.
45 [d. at 206.
46 See DAVID lH. PHILLIPS ET AL., STOCKHOLM INTERNATIONAL WATER
INSTITUTE, THE TWO ANALYSIS -INTRODUCING A METHODOLOGY FOR THE TRANSBOUNDARY
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Shared benefits emerged from the 1961 Canada-United States
Columbia River Treaty,47 and have become a general principle of
international water law48 and environmental law generally. The United States
and Canada wanted to dam the mighty Columbia primarily for power
generation and flood control. Downstream dams in Washington state and
Oregon would have deprived Canada of opportunities for power generation;
Canada's planned dams would have provided substantial flood control
benefits to the United States. The parties agreed to allow the major
development in the United States but Canada was compensated. The idea has
been applied in other basins where upstream states can store but divert water
and downstream states consume the flow. In recent years, there have been
increasing calls to shift the focus of international disputes from the allocation
to benefit sharing.
The force of this idea can be seen in the evolving efforts to resolve a
decades-long dispute between Egypt and her co-upstream riparians on the
Nile. Shared benefits are at the heart of the much heralded Nile Basin
Initiative, which is designed to try and preserve decades of legal and political
gridlock that Egypt has been able to sustain, blocking all upstream
development.49 The Initiative is based on the sustainable development of the
entire basin and the equitable utilization of, and benefit from, the common
Nile Basin water resources.50 Elsewhere, I have argued that shared benefits
have a legitimate role to play in the allocation of transboundary waters as
long as they are seen only as one among a broad menu of policy instruments
able to promote the fair and efficient allocation of scarce waters.51 In
addition, the record of large dams to promote the optimum use of water and
social equity is increasingly being questioned. The global record of large
dams, as documented by the World Commission on Dams, reveals that
poorly planned large dams can exacerbate problems of poverty, water
inequity, regional tensions and environmental degradation.52 Thus, the hope
of the advocates of the shared benefit approach is that the monetization of
WATER OPPORTUNITIES ANALYSIS, REpORT 23 (2008), available at
http://www.siwi.org/salnode.asp?node=423 (setting out the full range of cooperation
opportunities in an international river basin).
47 Treaty Relating to Cooperative Development of the Water Resources of the
Columbia River Basin, U.S.-Can., Jan. 17, 1961, 15 U.S.T. 1555.
48 See Richard Paisley, Adversaries Into Partners: International Water Law and
the Equitable Sharing of Downstream Benefits, 3 MELB. J. INT'L L. 280, 284-288 (2002)
(using the Columbia River as an example of the positive results from sharing downstream
benefits).
49 See STOCKHOLM INT'L WATER INST., TRANSBOUNDARY WATER MANAGEMENT
AS AREGIONAL PuBuc GoOD: FINANCING DEVELOPMENT: AN EXAMPLE FROM THE NILE BASIN
6 (2007) (''The NBI seeks to develop the river in a cooperative manner, while sharing the
substantial socioeconomic benefits it provides, and promoting regional peace and security.").
50 Id.
5! A. Dan Tarlock & Patricia Wouters, Are Shared Benefits of International
Waters an Equitable Apportionment?, 18 COLO. J.INT'L ENVTL. L. & POL'y 523 (2007).
52 WORLD COMM'N ON DAMS, DAMS AND DEVELOPMENT 15-17 (2000).
river waters will reduce fears and promote increased long-term international
cooperation that produces positive results for those living in the river basin.
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IV. WHAT IS WATER SECURITY?
A. The Traditional Meaning
Water security has traditionally had two meanings which apply both
to the rights of an individual or to the claims of a state on behalf of its
citizens. Historically, there was little expectation that the lack of security
would translate into widespread social unrest or even violence. The frrst
meaning is a frrm water right which can be judicially or diplomatically
enforced against those who interfere with it. Domestic water law is
structured to channel and minimize conflict and competition because the
object of all water law is to allow the acquisition of frrm, quasi-exclusive
rights to the use of water.53 It does this by minimizing but not eliminating the
risks inherent in the use of water. All water law is premised on the
assumption that the water is a scarce resource that must be rationally and
fairly allocated among competing claimants. Although water rights are
inherently correlative, given the fugitive and variable nature of water bodies,
quasi-exclusive entitlements can be fixed. Once these entitlements are fixed,
the costs of inference are also set and competitors should be discouraged
from interfering with existing rights. A fixed allocation has two benefits.
First, conflict is channeled into litigation rather than violence, if a competitor
wishes to contest the legality of a use. And, if a competitor cannot displace a
use through the courts, negotiation is always an alternative. Second, a fixed
allocation forces a nation to adapt to new demands. For example, markets
can be used to shift water from lower to higher valued uses and imports can
be substituted for local production.
The second traditional meaning of security is a physically
dependable supply. This can be tied to a legal allocation or it can be simply
based on capture and a low risk that any other party can interfere with the
capture. In both arid and humid areas, water rights are provided by a right
backed up by carry-over storage, dams and reservoirs. On international
rivers, the practice has often been reversed. Many nations have dammed and
diverted and then forced other states to negotiate an allocation from this new
reality. This option is becoming more problematic for two reasons. First,
there are growing criticisms of the performance of large multiple purpose
projects and calls to pay more attention to the social and environmental
consequences of its poorly planned dams, although China, India and Turkey
have largely ignored this call. The second is the specter of many global
S3 This characterization of a water right was adopted by the New Mexico
Supreme Court in Walker v. United States, 162 P.3d 882, 888 (N.M. 2007) (quoting Charles
Du Mars & A. Dan Tarlock, Symposium Introduction: New Challenges to State Water
Allocation Supremacy, 29 NAT. REs. J. 331,332 (1989)).
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warming scenarios suggesting that reservoir systems will not be able to
deliver their projected amounts of water and hydroelectric power as
evaporation rates increase so that the costs of unilateral capture may exceed
the benefits.
B. The New Definition ofWater Security: Water Insecurity an
Unacceptable Risk
As a result of increasing uncertainty about future supplies, the
concept of water security today is being expanded beyond these traditional
definitions to include the guarantee of sufficient water for a nation's
sustainable food production.54 The assumption is that unless sufficient water
exists for this and related health purposes, the lack of water will become a
source of social insecurity or violence. This risk is especially high for poor
nations in Africa and Asia which cannot easily substitute imports for lost
production from diminished water supplies in relation to its population and
have limited political and fmancial adaptive capacity.55 A nation must have a
sufficient confidence level in its continued territorial integrity, social stability
and sustainability, but the common thread running through both definitions is
the heightened fear of the drastic consequences of an inadequate supply. A
drought (or flood) induced food crisis can trigger migration which can
change the ethnic balance of the host country and spill across borders in a
catchment basin.56
V. THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL WATER LAW IN
PROMOTING WATER SECURITY
A.International Water Law's Functions
This section examines the possible roles that international water law
can have in promoting water security. Law must perform two roles to
achieve this objective, but it alone cannot alleviate the fears, real
incompatible demands, inequitable distributions and supply uncertainties that
create the risk of water insecurity and the disruptive and unnecessary
consequences that could follow. First, the law must fairly define the rights of
respective states to set the outer limits of the use of the resource. Second, to
respond to many challenges posed by global climate change, increasing
water consumption and population growth, adaptive management institutions
must be developed to sustain interstate cooperation.57 Mter that it depends on
54 See SANDRA POSTEL, PILLAR OF SAND: CAN THE IRRIGATION MIRACLE LAST?
(1999) (leading articulation of this thesis).
55 See GERMAN ADVISORY COUNCIL ON GLOBAL CHANGE, supra note 11, at 93-
102.
56 [d. at 159.
57 See Joseph W. Dellapena, Adapting to the Law Water Management to Global
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political will to manage a resource over the long run, trust among all classes
of users, and the marshaling of the necessary financial resources to support
cooperation. International water law shares the same conflict reduction
incentive. International law recognizes that each state has an inchoate right to
a fair share of the resource.58 It seeks to provide all nations which share a
common watercourse a permanent, fair, and dependable share of a common
supply and thus prevent rival, unresolved claims from festering over time.
The problem is the gap between principle and practice.
-
B. International Water Law: Principle Versus Practice
International law has made some progress toward the first objective
but less toward the second. It remains strong in principle but weak in
practice. The law is derived from United States Supreme Court
jurisprudence, ironically itself based on international law,59 and grandly
posits that all riparian states must share the use of a common river. The law
developed in the United States because the Supreme Court has the power,
under its original jurisdiction,60 to hear water disputes among riparian states.
The basic principle that the Court has articulated is that all states are entitled
to an equitable apportionment of an interstate river since they can neither go
to war against the other nor enter into treaties.61
Unfortunately, too often the practice of many riparian states,
especially upstream ones, is to unilaterally divert, degrade and defend or to
stall agreeing to a sharing arrangement. This reality was affirmed in the Lake
Lanoux Arbitration, which rejected the principle that a nation must seek the
consent of a co-riparian before undertaking a major water development
project.62 The practice of damming and diverting is reinforced by the general
legal bias of rewarding the first person - soit individual or state - to put the
water to productive use. Priority protection can take many forms, but the net
result is that the principle, or the fear that it will be applied, can chill or
foreclose development by slower growing or less wealthy states. To counter
Climate Change and Other Hydropolitical Stresses, 35 J. AM. WATER RESOURCES ASS'N 1301
(1999).
58 See A1TILA TANZI & MAURIZIO ARCARI, THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION
ON THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL WATERCOURSES 15 (Dr. Patricia Wouters & Dr. Serguei
Vinogradov eds., 2001) ("[A]l1 co-riparians enjoy within their territory equal rights in the use
of a shared watercourse, so that the right to utilisation of each riparian must respect (and be
co-ordinated with) the correlative rights of other riparians.").
59 Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 97 (1906). The Court applied federal, state
and international law for the proposition that "underlying all the relations of the [federal]
States to each other, is that of quality of right." Id. at 97.
60 U.S. CONST. art. ill, § 2.
61 See Charles J. Meyers, The Colorado River, 19 STAN. L. REv. 1,48-51 (1966)
(noting the difficulties of applying the equitable apportionment doctrine). States can, however,
enter into interstate compacts. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10.
62 See Brunson MacChesney, Judicial Decisions Involving Questions of
International Law, 53 AM. J.INT'L L. 156 (1959) (discussing the Lake Lanoux Case).
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the practice of states taking unilateral action and the inevitable argument that
they have perfected vested rights that cannot be disturbed, international water
law borrowed United States jurisprudence. The core principle articulated in
codifications and conventions is that all riparian states have a right to the
equitable utilization of the watercourse.63
There is now a strong consensus among international lawyers that
riparian states should agree to share fairly the waters of international rivers
among their co-riparian states to counter unilateralism. Nations, with some
exceptions, have accepted the principle that no one state can monopolize a
resource.64 Fairness has now been expanded to include protection of
environmental interests which have very little footing within the traditional
calculus of entitlements.65 All formulations of equitable apportionment
standards stem from the 1967 Helsinki Rules adopted by the International
Association.66 Geography, hydrology, climate and vital national needs are
relevant factors. The latest and most widely used formulation is contained in
the July 8, 1997 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Non-
Navigational Uses of International Water Courses which is now open for
signature.67 The Convention is unlikely to enter into force given the slow
pace of ratifications but it remains authoritative as a statement of customary
international water law.68 Article V enjoins states to use watercourses in an
"equitable and reasonable manner." Article V is followed by Article VI
which lists seven non-weighted factors relevant to the determination of what
is equitable and reasonable. The International Law Association has replaced
the Helsinki Rules with the Berlin Rules69 which reflect the recent
63 This principle is consistent with the modern characterization of international
law as a system to promote distributive justice of scarce resources among the international
community. See THOMAS M. FRANCK, FAIRNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INSTITUTIONS 74
(1995) (describing the Draft Convention on the Non-Navigational Uses of Watercourses as an
effort "to provide for distribution of a scarce resource through the application of broadly
conceived equity").
64 International Agreements often acknowledge this principle. See Agreement on
the Establishment of a Permanent Okavango River Basin Water Commission (OKACOM),
Angl.-Bots.-Namib., Sept. 15, 1994, http://faolex.fao.org/docs/ pdflmu117435.pdf [hereinafter
OKACOM].
65 See generally OWEN McINTYRE, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION OF
INTERNATIONAL WATER COURSES UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW (2007) (explaining the law's
evolution).
66 See HELINSKI RULES ON THE USES OF THE WATERS OF INTERNATIONAL RIvERS
(1967), reprinted in INTERNATIONAL LAW OF WATER RESOURCES, supra note 37, at 99.
61 Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International
Watercourses, May 21,1997,36 I.L.M. 700.
68 McINTYRE, supra note 65, at 71-75 (discussing the various provisions of the
Convention and noting that the Convention is based on the draft article of the International
Law Commission, "[t]he most important body with regard to the codification of international
law").
69 INT'L LAW ASS'N, FOURTH REPORT OF THE WATER RESOURCES COMMITI'EE,
BERLIN CONFERENCE: WATER RESOURCES LAW (2004), http://www.ila-
hq.org/pdflWater%20ResourceslFinal%20Report%202004.pdf.
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recognition of environmental interests and the need for cooperative basin
management, but the equitable apportionment standards remain the same.
The Convention's multi-factor test encompasses the full range of
uses of a watercourse but gives nations little guidance about what their fair
share is and whether it will be available in the future. International water law
is more insecure than domestic water law. Given the sovereign interests at
stake, more weight must be given, at least in theory, to the displacement of
existing uses by subsequent ones.70 International water law broadened the
concept to equitable apportionment, equitable utilization and the protection
of prior uses as important but not decisive factors. In contrast, United States
equitable apportionment law is heavily weighted toward the protection of
existing vested interests.71 States must negotiate interstate compacts to obtain
a right to unused waters.72
c. Does Fairness Equal Water Security?
The question that must be posed is: Does the recognition of fairness,
combined with the increasingly rigorous procedural rules that apply to a
state's decision to claim its equitable share of an international watercourse,
substitute cooperation for conflict? To answer this question one must ask,
what is international water law? There are three possible answers. The first is
that it is an aspirational illusion which functions only to chastise state
practices which run counter to its norms. The second is that it is a set of
binding customary principles that have been widely accepted by states during
most of the preceding century when the necessity to apportion rivers in a
systematic manner arose. Like the middle bear in the fairy tale, the third
position, international water law, is best seen as a set of framework
principles that invite nations to reach a negotiated solution that puts in place
an institution for future cooperation. The problem is that all three are
accurate to a point, but none fully capture the varieties of practices among
nations. The law's uncertainty and vagueness makes it "soft" and
aspirational. At its worst, international water law serves as justification for
practices that run counter to the underlying message of a fair, long-term
sharing among nations. Balanced against this is the general consensus that
most accept and practice the idea that common supplies must be apportioned
70 See James C. McMurray & A. Dan Tarlock, The Law of Later-Developing
Riparian States: The Case of Afghanistan, 12 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 711 (2005) (exploring the
argument that Mghanistan is a classic example of a (very) slow developing headwaters state
and the possibility that its riparian claims might displace those of its other Central Asian
neighbors).
71 The Court announced a flexible formula in Wyoming v. Nebraska, 325 U.S.
589, 618 (1945), but priority remains the most important factor in determining what is
equitable.
72 See Colorado v. New Mexico, 467 U.S. 310, 323-24 (1984) (requiring that the
State requesting access to interstate water present the harms and benefits of the accession to
both states affected).
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equitably among co-riparian states.73 There is no definite answer to the
question whether fairness promotes security because authoritative
applications of equitable apportionment do not exist. The most important
recent international water law precedent is the International Court of Justice
decision in Case Concerning the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Republic of
Hungary v. Slovak Federal Republic).74 All three characterizations of
international water law can be found in it. In 1977, the two Soviet Block
countries signed a joint river basin investment treaty for the construction of
the multiple-purposed Gabcikovo-Nagymaros hydroelectric, navigation
improvement and flood control lock and dam project on the Danube between
Bartislava and Budapest,75 During the 1980s, the project became
controversial in Hungary for economic and environmental reasons, but
Czechoslovakia continued to build at a faster rate than Hungary. By the
spring of 1989, the Gabcikovo dam was 85% complete and the bypass canal
was between 60% and 95% complete; Hungary, however, had only construed
the coffer dam for its promised downstream Nagymaros dam in the Danube
bend.76
Hungary unilaterally suspended work on the project in 1989 for
fiscal and environmental reasons and one year later suspended the treaty as a
"mistake" after she broke away from the then Soviet Union. The ICJ only
decided the respective states' rights under the 1977 treaty and rejected
Hungary's invitation to develop new customary water law principles. The
Court acknowledged the potential applicability of the doctrine of equitable
apportionment, but it did not directly apportion the Danube's flow or apply
the new emerging principles of international environmental law to this water
dispute. For example, it rejected some of the broader proposed readings of
the precautionary principle and narrowly intetpreted Article Thirty-Three of
the Draft Articles of International Responsibility to States, which provides
that a state may invoke the doctrine of necessity only in limited
circumstances to justify a wrongful state act.77 The Court found that Hungary
failed to establish "that a real 'grave' and 'imminent' 'peril' existed in 1989
and that the state's response was "the only possible response.,,78 Instead,
73 See McINTYRE, supra note 65, at 23-28 (discussing the "principle of equitable
utilization ... in the development of customary international law").
74 Gabcikovo-Nagyrnaros Project (Hung. v. Slovk.), 1997 I.C.J. 7 (Sept. 25),
available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docketlfiles/9217375.pdf. See also Paul R. Williams,
International Environmental Dispute Resolution: The Dispute Between Slovakia and Hungary
Concerning Construction of the Gabcikovo and Nagymaros Dams, 19 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1
. (1994).
75 The history of the project is long and complex. See Stephen Deets, National
Discourse and the Formation of Irreconcilable Symbols: The Case of the Gabcikovo-
Nagymaros Dams, in STATE AND NATION BUILDING IN EAST CENTRAL EUROPE 115-131 (John
S. Micgiel ed., 1996).
76 GabCz1wvo-Nagymaros Project, 1997 I.C.J. at 31.
77 Id. at 39-40.
78 Id. at 45; see also Afshin A-Khavari and Donald R. Rothwell, The IIC and
Danube Dam Case: A Missed Opportunity for International Environmental Law?, 22 MELB.
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Hungary had other means of responding to the threats to the River's ecology
other than suspension and abandonment.
By a fourteen to one vote, the Court concluded that the treaty
created a territorial regime on the reach of the River that was unaffected by
the break up of the former Czechoslovakia. Hungary's environmentally
changed conditions defense was rejected because the possibility that
subsequent environmental information would require a modification of the
project was not completely unforeseen in 1977 and did not preclude a mutual
adjustment by the two countries. Hungary only got some legal crumbs by
way of dicta. The Court acknowledged that changed environmental
conditions may affect the operation of a project.79 New knowledge of
ecological risk may impose a duty on parties to a complex river basin
development treaty to take the information into consideration in the ongoing
implementation of the treaty and management of the river. In the end, the
Court voted thirteen to two that the two states must undertake good faith
negotiations consistent with both international environmental norms such as
sustainable development and the law of international water courses.80 The
two countries have signed agreements to develop a new management scheme
in the context of the already constructed projects in Slovakia,81 but the
dispute and the status of the dam, for which construction as not yet begun,
U. L. REv. 507, 515 (1998) (arguing that required level of scientific certainty will defeat the
operation of the precautionary principle). Article Thirty-Three of the Draft Articles on the
International Responsibility of States adopted by the International Law Commission embodies
a limited precautionary principle. GabCtkovo-Nagymaros Project, 1997 I.e.J. at 39-42. To
invoke this article, a state must demonstrate by credible scientific evidence that a real risk will
materialize in the near future and is thus more than a possibility. [d. The Court found that
Hungary's evidence of risk and the possible range of alternatives did not meet these standards.
[d.
79 United States law supports this principle. Initially, courts held that the National
Environmental Policy Act did not apply to the operations of dams constructed before the
passage of NEPA. See Upper Snake River Chapter of Trout Unlimited v. Hodel, 921 F.2d
232, 233 (9th Cir. 1990). However, a subsequent federal district court decision has applied the
statute to on-going management activities of a dam. See Or. Desert Ass'n v. Green, 953 F.
Supp. 1133, 1149 (D. Or. 1997) (dealing with questions of grazing in a wild and scenic river
corridor). Further, in 1992, the Secretary of the Interior reversed a prior departmental position
and agreed to prepare an EIS when the turbines of Glen Canyon dam, completed before NEPA
was enacted, were upgraded. The decision was made as Congress was in the process of
enacting legislation. See Grand Canyon Protection Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-575, 106
Stat. 4600 (1992) (mandating an EIS).
80 The majority opinion downgraded sustainable development to a "concept"
rather than a principle.
8! In 1995 Slovakia and Hungary signed a temporary agreement to divide the
water in the Danube between the original river bed and the Moson branch. Heiko Fiirst, The
Hungarian-Slovakian Conflict Over the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Dams: An Analysis,
INTERMARIUM, Mar. 2003, at 1, 8 & n.23., http://www.ciaonet.orglolj/intiinc0602b.pdf.This
agreement was expected to repair the ecological damage at the expense of the loss of 150
gigawatt hours of hydroelectric power. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T. OF ENERGY,
INTERNATIONAL ENERGY OUTLOOK 71 (1996), available at http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/ftprootl
forecastingl048496.pdf.
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remains unsettled.82
Vice President Weeramantry of Sri Lanka was willing to go further
and articulate general principles. His separate opinion adopts the interrelated
principles of environmentally sustainable development and cautionary
environmental assessment and management as erga omnes customary rules.
Mter an extensive survey of the emergence of international environmental
law and the Asian history of balancing resource use and nature protection, he
concluded that:
Among [the principles] which may be extracted from the
systems already referred to are such far-reaching principles
as the principle of trusteeship of earth resources, the
principle of intergenerational rights and the principle that
development and environmental conservation must go hand
in hand. Land is to be respected as having a vitality of its
own and being integrally linked to the welfare of the
community . . . . Sustainable development is thus not
merely a principle of modem international law. It is one of
the most ancient ideas in the human heritage. Fortified from
the insights that can be gained from millennia of human
experience, it has an important role to play in the service of
internationallaw.83
The crucial question remains whether international water IS
sufficiently robust to address the new security fears. The question is
important because ultimately the reduction of fear among riparian states will
require the cooperative planning and management processes described in the
next section. However, these processes function best when there is a default
rule which is perceived by all parties as inferior to the results produced by
the process. To function as a default rule, international water law must be
clear enough to indicate the likely allocation, should the matter proceed to
the Ie] or another tribunal. Three possible hypotheses about the relationship
between international water law and the new meaning of water security exist.
The first asserts that law magnifies conflict because it is too uncertain and
weak to deter unilateral, preemptive action. For example, the law provides
very little protection of downstream states who want to preserve some
portion of the natural flow for either environmental reasons or future
development.84 Despite efforts to incorporate environmental values into
82 See generally Furst, supra note 8l.
83 Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung. v. Slovk.), 1997 I.e.J. 7, llO (Sept. 25)
(separate opinion of Vice President Weeramantry), available at http://www.icj-
cij.orgldocket/files/92/7383.pdf. The jurisprudential basis for his suggestion that international
environmental law norms may involve into erga omnes obligations is developed by Eva
Kornicker Uhlmann. See Eva M. Kornicker Uhlmann, State Community Interests: Jus Cogens
and the Protection of the Global Environment-Developing Criteria for Peremptory Norms, II
GEO.INT'LENVTL. L. REv. 101 (1998).
84 See A. Nollkaemper, The Contribution ofthe International Law Commission to
International Water Law: Does It Reverse the Flightfrom Substance?, 28 NETHERLANDS Y.B.
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international water law, there is little protection of the natural flow rule in
practice.85 Strictures against causing pollution could be source of flow
protection, but rivers are protected only from serious episodes of pollution.
The material injury rule, which is at the heart of equitable apportionment,
allows upstream states to progressively use water which creates the risk of
environmental damage but not legally cognizable damage. For example,
upstream diversions may generally increase the salinity of rivers by allowing
salt water to migrate upstream. In addition, pollution is often limited to
serious, identifiable pollution rather than less visible, cumulative impacts
from environmentally destructive watershed land use practices. The
presumed remedy is post hoc mitigation rather than prevention.86
The second hypothesis asserts the opposite: law reduces these
conflicts because it is clear enough to inject substantive and procedural
fairness into allocation controversies. The object of the allocation and
management of international basins is to promote development, social equity
and environmental protection in a fair and sustainable manner, not simply to
shift monetary resources within the basin. The United Nations Convention
and the Berlin rules make it clear that no one state can monopolize a supply.
These rules require making credible projections about what an equitable
apportionment might be.87 The third hypothesis asserts that uncertain and
weak law is positive because it provides an incentive for states to forego
unilateral action and negotiate cooperative management institutions that
reduce uncertainty and fear of shortage.
D. Toward Integrated Water Management
Traditionally, nations solved water disputes by a treaty or softer
document but did not create institutions to deal with changing conditions in
the basin. Treaties can either divide the waters among riparian nations or
merely promise future cooperation. Fixed allocations are relatively rare88 and
INr'L L. 39, 62-67 (1996) (questioning whether the Articles on the Law of the Non-
Navigational Uses of International Watercourses could be used to protect ecosystems); see
also McINTYRE, supra note 65, at 286-315 (tracing the evolution of incorporation of
ecosystem into customary and treaty regimes designed only to sanction well-defined and
immediate external threats to a nation's territorial integrity).
85 See, e.g., Lake Lanoux Arbitration (Fr. v. Spain), 24 I.L.R. 101 (Arbitral Trib.
1957) (rejecting any right to the undiminished flow of an international stream); Charles B.
Bourne, The Right to Utilize the Waters of International Rivers, 3 CAN. Y.B. INr'L L. 187,
190-203 (1965) (explaining the rise and fall of the theory of the undiminished flow of an
international river).
86 See Torn Iwama, Emerging Principles and Rules for the Prevention and
Mitigation of Environmental Harm, in ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE AND INTERNATIONAL
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 107 (1992).
87 See generally PA1RICIA K. WOUTERS ET AL., SHARING TRANSBOUNDARY
WATERS (2005) (attempting to provide a methodology for the application of the equitable
apportionment factors).
88 See Jesse H. Hammer & Aaron T. Wolf, Patterns in International Water
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many existing fixed allocations are increasingly criticized as inequitable,
lacking in environmental protection provisions and out of date in light of
advances in hydrology and global climate change.89 The general consensus in
the international water community is that the majority of treaties, especially
in the developing world, are not robust, especially because they provide
inadequate dispute resolution and long-term management procedures. More
permanent, functioning basin management institutions are needed with the
capacity to build sufficient trust among the parties to permit adaptation to
new conditions and demands for water use.90
The management of the pristine Okavango River in southern Africa
is a case in point. The river is shared between three countries each with
different views of its use.91 Angola, the headwaters state, is emerging from
decades of civil war and is just now considering her use options. Namibia
and Botswana are among the driest countries in the world.92 Namibia views
the River as the only dependable source of water for the central part of the
country where her population is concentrated, and has proposed a diversion
to the head of the Eastern National Water Carrier.93 Arid Botswana depends
on the flow both for existing and planned agriculture and to sustain a vibrant
ecotourism industry in the wildlife rich Okavango Delta, the largest Ramsar
Convention wetlands in the world. In 1994, the three countries signed a
general agreement creating a commission to develop criteria for the equitable
utilization and sustainable development of the River,94 and this has evolved
in a more ambitious, broad-based, long term cooperative effort to collect and
share the data necessary to develop a coherent management for this aquatic
treasure.95
Resource Treaties: The Transboundary Freshwater Dispute Database, 9 COLO. ], INT'L.
ENVTL. L. & POL'y 157, 162 (1998). The United Nations Food and Agricultural Organization
lists some 3,600 water-related treaties beginning in A.D. 805. Id. at 158. However, modem
scholars use a database of about 145 treaties, and only fifty-four of those have a fixed
allocation.Id. at 162.
89 Examples include the Colorado and Nile rivers. See A. Dan Tarlock, How Well
Can International Water Allocation Regimes Adapt to Global Climate Change?, 15 J. LAND
USE & ENVTL. L. 423 (2000).
90 See generally Aaron T. Wolf, Transboundary Water Conflicts and
Cooperation, in IN SEARCH OF SUSTAINABLE WATER MANAGEMENT 131 (Douglas S. Kenny
ed., 2005).
91 See Volker Boge, A Glass Half Full or Half Empty? Water, Conflict and
Cooperation in Southern Africa, in REsOURCE POUTICS IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA 273, 291-
299 (Matthias Basedau & Andreas Mehler eds., 2005) (detailing the Okavango case).
92 See Peter Ashton, African Dialogue Lecture Series, Southern African Water
Conflicts: Are They Inevitable or Preventable? 9 (Feb. 24, 2000), http://www.dams.org/docs/
kbase/submissions/opt147.pdf. A map of African river basins is almost blank for the two
countries except for the Okavango which forms Namibia's northern border with Angola and
the Delta in far northern Botswana. Id.
93 Id. at 8-12.
94 See Establishment of a Permanent Okavango River Basin Commission
(OKACOM), supra note 64, art. 4.3.
95 See Soderstrom et al., supra note 41, at 17.
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The evolving Okavango management regime is an example of the
current thinking in the world water community that the best hope for the
adoption of sustainable water management both within and among nations is
the adoption of Integrated Water Resource Management (IWRM).96 The
basic thrust of IWRM is the permanent management of water resources on a
sustainable, basin-wide basis. IWRM is not a totally new concept. It is not a
substitute for making hard political choices about alternative water use
options and the necessity for agreement among riparian states about their
respective shares of a common river. For example, IWRM counsels that new
demands for water must be recognized as potential constraints on traditional,
often inefficient uses to accommodate new environmental and social equity
uses.
There is a long history of treating river basins systems as single units
and trying to plan and execute comprehensive management regimes
characterized by integrated dams and irrigation and canal systems. IWRM
builds on this long tradition of river basin planning, with deep roots in the
United States and the former Soviet Union, but tries to correct the
environmental and social myopia of previous planning and water resources
development models. The concept introduces greater public involvement and
economic discipline into water management and allocation practice, and it
extends it across political boundaries. IWRM equally focuses much more on
developing a wider range of alternatives to achieve long-term
environmentally and socially sustainable water uses compared to previous
planning models and practices and. on creating permanent institutions that
can adapt to changing conditions. Because it is river basin or catchment area-
focused, it can either be confined to the national level or expanded across
national boundaries.
IWRM is now the world standard for water management, if only
because its formal adoption is a condition for European water resources
development and planning funding. It was endorsed in Agenda 21, the
environmental action plan for the twenty-first century agreed to at the 1992
United Nations Rio de Janeiro Conference on Environment and Development
(UNCED). It is also one of the six principles adopted at the 1992 Dublin
Conference on Water and the Environment. Between UNCED in 1992 and
the 2002 World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD) or Rio Plus
lOin Johannesburg, South Africa, IWRM was endorsed by the Commission
on Sustainable Development,97 the General Assembly of the United
Nations,98 and the Ministerial Declaration of the International Conference on
96 This section is adapted from Lakshman Guriswamy and A. Dan Tarlock,
Sustainability and the Future of Western Water Law, in IN SEARCH OF SUSTAINABLE WATER
MANAGEMENT, supra note 90, at 155.
97 U.N. COMM'N ON SUSTAINABLE DEV., REpORT OF THE EXPERT GROUP MEETING
ON STRATEGIC APPROACHES TO FRESHWATER <j[ 11 (1998), http://www.un.org/documents/
ecosoc/cnI7/1998/background/ecnl71998-freshrep.htm.
98 G.A. Res. 55/196, U.N. Doc. AlRES/55/196 (Feb. 1,2001).
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Freshwater.99 It was reafftnned as an international norm at the WSSD in
Johannesburg. The WSSD re-articulated that environmentally sustainable
development consists of three mutually reinforcing principles: economic
development, social development and environmental protection. tOO WSSD's
primary contribution is to add social development as a separate and coequal
principle. Previously, it was only a component of economic development. In
developing IWRM, the WSSD emphasizes the extent to which human needs
are fulfilled by environmental protection as an integral part of economic and
social development. In short, IWRM has always been based upon the
foundational premises of environmentally sustainable development, but the
WSSD reemphasized the need to integrate economic and social development
with environmental protection.
IWRM calls for the holistic management of freshwater as a finite and
vulnerable resource, and the integration of sectoral water plans and programs
within the framework of economic and social policy. lOt The objectives of
integrated water resources management, as articulated in Agenda 21, are:
1. The promotion of a dynamic, interactive, iterative
and multisectoral approach to water resource
management, including the identification and
protection of potential sources of freshwater supply,
that integrates technological, socioeconomic,
environmental and human health considerations;
2. The planning of strategies for the sustainable and
rational utilization, protection, conservation and
management of water resources based on
community needs and priorities within the
framework of national economic development
policy;
3. To design, implement and evaluate projects and
programmes that are both economically efficient and
socially appropriate within clearly defmed
strategies, based on an approach of full public
participation, including that of women, youth,
99 Ministerial Session of the International Conference on Freshwater, Ministerial
Declaration (Dec. 4, 2001), http://www.water-2001.deloutcomelMinistersDeclarationi
Ministerial_Declaration.pdf.
100 World Summit on Sustainable Development, Aug. 26-Sept. 4, 2002, Report of
the World Summit on Sustainable Development, tj[ 5, U.N. Doc. AlCONF.199/20.
101 U.N. DEP'T OF ECON. & SOC. AFFAIRS, PROTECTION OF TIlE QUALITY AND
SUPPLY OF FREsHWATER RESOURCES: APPLICATION OF INTEGRATED APPROACHES TO TIlE
DEVELOPMENT, MANAGEMENT, AND USE OF WATER RESOURCES tj[ 18.6 (1992),
http://www.un.org/esa/sustdev/documents/agenda2l1english/agenda2lchapterI8.htm. In many
countries, fragmented and incomplete water authority frustrates these objectives. See S.M.K.
Donkor & Yilma E. Wolde, U.N. Econ. Comm'n for Africa, Integrated Water Resources
Management in Africa: Issues and Options, http://www.ramsar.org/wurc/wurchbk4cs1.doc.
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indigenous people and local communities in water
management policymaking and decision-making;
4. The identification strengthening, or development, as
required, in particular in developing countries, the
appropriate institutional, legal and financial
mechanisms to ensure that water policy and its
implementation are catalysts for sustainable social
progress and economic growth.
Many countries of the world have adopted IWRM in principle. lo2
This is not surprising. Very few countries formally want to endorse
unsustainable water use and ad hoc, uncoordinated water planning, although
both are widely practiced. IWRM is also often a way to legitimate new,
controversial, objectives. For example, Brazil adopted IWRM in its most
recent water policy, although she did so, in part, to justify bulk water tariffs
to support watershed and basin planning and to finance the administration of
water permits. 103 In other cases, the adoption of IWRM is part of the project
of entrance into the world (western) community of nations. The 2000
European Union Water Framework Directive adopts IWRM to improve the
water quality of the Union's heavily used rivers. The Directive requires a
river basin management plan that prioritizes risks and establishes cost
effective measures to reduce pollution loads and flood damage. 104 This
Directive will influence almost all developing countries that want EU funds
or World Bank or other financing.
IWRM must be supplemented by Adaptive Management, a
management strategy developed in the late 1970s as a remedy to the defects
in static or deterministic environmental assessment. Its proponents argued
that "a fixed review of an independently designed policy"I05 was inconsistent
with the experience of resource managers worldwide and with what has
come to be called non-equilibrium ecology.I06 Adaptive management is a
rigorous, continuous process of acquiring and evaluating scientific
information. IO? The hope is that the technique will permit decision makers to
102 See, e.g., Viktor A. Dukhovni, Prospects for Central Asia Development -
Integrated Water Resources Management as Regional Issues Solution, in IMPLEMENTING
INTEGRATED WATER RESOURCES MANAGEMENT IN CENTRAL ASIA 127 (patricia Wouters et al.
eds., 2007).
103 Raymundo Garrido, Water Resources National Policy in Brazil,
http://www.dams.org/docs/kbase/contrib/ins226.pdf (contributing paper prepared for the
World Commission on Dams).
104 Council Directive 20OO/601EC, 2000 0.1. (L 327) 1 (EC), available at
http://eur-lex.europa.eulLexUriServ!LexUriServ.do?uri=0J:L:2000:327:0001:OO72:EN:PDF.
105 !NT'L mST. FOR APPLIED SYs. ANALYSIS, ADAPTIVE ENVIRONMENTAL
ASSESSMENT AND MANAGEMENT 1 (C.S. Hollings ed., 1980) (arguing that "this reactive
approach will inhibit laudable economic enterprises as well as violate critical environmental
constraints").
106 See generally Marc Ebbin, Is The Southern California Approach to
Conservation Succeeding?, 24 ECOLOGY L.Q. 695 (1997).
107 NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, DOWNSTREAM: ADAPTIVE MANAGEMENT OF GLEN
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avoid the paralysis that scientific uncertainty creates by viewing management
as an experiment that can progressively reduce scientific uncertainty over
time. 108 Adaptive management can introduce flexibility into water allocation
regimes by supporting new allocations with mitigation plans or by the short-
term alteration of fixed allocations.109
VI. CONCLUSION
We have made some progress toward the recognition that
international waters are resources that must be fairly shared among riparian
nations.110 We have made less progress toward the implementation of real
IWRM. It is never easy to implement a concept such as IWRM across
national boundaries. It requires a firm, fair, but not rigid, allocation of a
watercourse supported by strong management institutions, a high level of
cooperation among all interests and continuous adaptation to new conditions.
It also carries an important legal implication. The more nations cooperate to
manage a water resource, the more they will be forced to move from the
narrow notion that equitable apportionment gives them a share of the river to
do with as they please to the idea that all riparian states share a community of
interest in an international watercourse. lll This shifts the emphasis from the
declaration of permanent rights divorced from management, to the duty to
cooperatively manage international courses for a variety of uses from
hydropower generation, consumption to the conservation of heritage
ecosystems.112 Law alone cannot carry the burden of reducing the rising fears
that all water allocation is a zero sum game. It can, however, help build trust
among users and thus strengthen management institutions. This is the long
run route to making sure that the projected violent conflicts over water never
materialize.
CANYON DAM AND THE COLORADO RIVER EcOSYSTEM 52-54 (1999), available at
http://site.ebrary.comllib/albertaaclDoc?id=10055027.
108 See Holly Doremus, Adaptive Management, the Endangered Species Act, and
the Institutional Challenges of "New Age" Environmental Protection, 41 WASHBURN L.J. 50
(2001).
109 For example, the amount of water to support an aquatic ecosystem is relatively
small compared to the basin's water balance and need not be supplied every year. This is the
case with respect to the restoration of the Colorado River Delta in Mexico. A. Dan Tarlock,
Possible Lessons From a Comparison of the Restoration of the Danube and Colorado Deltas,
19 PAC. MCGEORGE GLOBAL Bus. & DEV. L.J. 61, 64-65 (2006).
110 I will leave to another time the question of whether riparian nations have a duty
to share their resources with non-riparian nations. See FREsH WATER AND INTERNATIONAL
ECONOMIC LAW (Edith Brown Weiss et al. OOs., 2005).
111 See McINTYRE, supra note 65, at 28-40 (using various illustrations to
demonstrate common management and community interests in water resources).
112 For an example of a legal regime that is evolving to the conservation of a world
heritage ecosystem, see A. Dan Tarlock, The Great Lakes as an Environmental Heritage of
Humankind: An Intemational Law Perspective, 40 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 995 (2007).
